FAA AND CAA Rules for a reason Are the civil aviation authorities still fit for purpose? By Mike Clarke, retired captain he legal row that will soon engulf the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and Boeing, which has yet to properly start, will be held in the United States as both the manufacturer and its overseeing regulator are based there. The lawyers will be sharpening their pencils with glee as both sides get set to field hundreds to join the fight. It has produced a set-piece occasion, because it now appears that Boeing was authorised to carry out a series of very significant changes to their new Boeing 737 MAX 8. In other words, the manufacturer was cleared to check its own product without the usual process involving the FAA, which controls paperwork certifying products as being fit for public transport use. This was not done, apparently and, consequently, a large number of people were killed in two separate crashes. Subsequently, the CEO of Boeing was fired. The investigation will now have to decide if this hands off approach by the FAA was legal. Afterwards, simulator tests flying the same profile as the crashed aircraft found that even when well briefed highly experienced test pilots were unable to recover the aircraft from its death dive. It is reported that computer software may have been responsible for this terrible loss of life. The legal teams appear to have a major problem, as the ability to blame the operating crew is denied them. The simple fact is that they were unable to correct the flight path in spite of obvious attempts to do so. A lot of serious questions will now have to be answered before the inevitable claims for proper compensation can be paid to grieving relatives. They, sadly, will probably have to wait years while this monumental battle is fought. It looks likely to be similar to the untying of the Gordian Knot. Tests and evidence Boeing senior management will need to explain how someone seriously considered installing a system that could not be corrected by the operating crew. In addition, they will need to demonstrate what tests were carried out to allow for manual reversion, and what evidence they can produce to back up the safety of this correction. The scale of this new device needed to be demonstrated to crews converting onto an aircraft that, even for those with previous Boeing 737 experience, was a completely new type. What training was required and what drill cards were provided to the pilots for in-flight use? Do they hold a report from the Boeing company flight-test pilots to show that the recovery system that was built in actually worked? Was the senior computer ace at the company involved, and was he aware of the failures it was capable of? At what stage did the top men at Boeing approve the installation? It was, after all, a very important change in the expanded order book for the company, for one of the most successful aircraft they were building at Seattle. The result of this combination of errors not only led to some 60 of these machines now being towed to a car park, but also the possibility of orders being cancelled. Did Boeing seek approval from the FAA to speed up the process for financial gain? Who sought that approval, and is he able to justify what was a major mistake that could actually threaten the companys future? Did no-one at any stage raise any serious concerns and, if they did, can the court be provided with a copy? Just as serious is the decision taken by the FAA to grant Boeing the right to do the checking that should have been undertaken by the Authority itself, as mandated by the United States government. Who agreed to this, and what reason was given? Did the FAA receive any payments from Boeing? Finally, did Boeing produce any technical data to convince the authority that this new device was safe? As it was so new, did it not raise serious concerns? The point being, if that was not even worthy of significant attention, then who failed to recognise it and why was no specific training required by the very authority that issues its licences to the pilots who want the type rating? The combination of incidents that led to so many passengers being killed is a total failure. None of the proper checks and balances required to ensure aircraft safety at a high level were applied. The simple fact is that two major organisations failed, and the court has to decide why this happened as quickly as possible and ensure it never happens again. While the legal arguments are being sorted out, lets hope that the families involved in this are, for once, rapidly paid the correct compensation now. Grieving relatives, sadly, will probably have to wait years while this monumental battle is fought Difficult decisions Of course, our own CAA has, in the past, also had to take difficult decisions when unexpected incidents occur to British-registered aircraft. When I was BALPA Chairman, a horrible accident occurred at Manchester airport. A British Airtours Boeing 737 suffered a serious fire on the take-off run. The resulting conflagration caused 50 or more passengers to lose their lives as they attempted to exit the aircraft. A rear passenger door was cracked open, which allowed a fireball to enter the passenger cabin. Dense smoke with a fair degree of panic caused subsequent loss of life. BALPA was aware that a very similar fire had occurred at Cincinnati with a DC9. We contacted USALPA and tried to extract as much information as possible. In the DC9, the Americans had apparently established that the majority of those who had died from suffocation were seated around 50ft to 60ft from the nearest exit. We then asked them to confirm the US regulations for emergency exit procedures to be approved by the FAA. Now, we have all heard the standard airline response to a serious accident: Safety is our top priority and it always comes first. It sounds great, but at what price? The devil, as usual, is in the detail. The information on the passenger trials that are conducted defy imagination. A trial demonstration has to be done under the watchful eye of the FAA. Before this, the manufacturer spends the best part of two to three weeks selecting, from among its staff, those who will take part. The initial check of this group removes any overweight, infirm or disabled people; elderly passengers and children are also removed. Then, this healthy group of typical people are trained for a few days to ensure familiarity is drilled into them. Finally, they are led to the darkened hangar containing the test aircraft, and where the FAA, armed with its stopwatches, is waiting for them. Half the exits are then blocked off, but no scattered luggage is allowed. So, with this minimal training, the exit call is made and surprise, surprise its usually achieved in the required time and therefore passes. It really is annoying to me that, after 31 years of flying, I never once came across such a slim, healthy group of passengers on any flight I flew. Hands up those who have! Fortunately for us, our CAA took some positive actions as a result of that Manchester accident. Floor lighting was introduced to indicate the nearest exit point. Cabin furnishings were changed to a more fire-resistant material, and one seat was removed to improve accessibility to an emergency exit point. New engine checks were brought in to allow more careful monitoring of advance warning of potential engine problems, and exit door opening drills were modified to ensure cabin crew check there is no fire hazard outside. Our concerns over the way the demonstration was conducted in America were rejected by the FAA on the basis that it has always been done this way, so it would continue that way. Fancy being so stupid that we imagined they might wish to learn from old procedures. Nothing to do with reduced load factors or falls in profits of course not. We have all heard the standard airline response to a serious accident: Safety is our top priority and it always comes first. It sounds great, but at what price?