TECH LOG Flying solo Do aircraft really need two pilots? By David Keen, Log Board member Lets face it. Our passengers board trains that happily zoom between terminals without a driver and the travellers are good with that. After all, a driverless train is dead safe. Perhaps a poor choice of words? Cars are now driving around, in places such as California, that are allegedly fully automated. Although they do have the odd crash. So why on earth are two pilots needed to fly us to Malaga? Is there a case for one skilled person to do the job? Perhaps folk could even be travelling the globe in giant drones in the future, managed and flown from a much cheaper ground-based operator, instead of by one uniformed, over-paid pilot. Many passengers know that a pilots job is money for old rope, after all. Their tickets could be much cheaper if at least one pilot was dispensed with. Perhaps the travelling public could return to the halcyon days of a fiver for a flight to Spain. After all, the airlines would never think of maintaining their prices to boost their profit margins now would they? Well, there are a few ways to answer this issue. This view looks at some of the simplest ways of explaining it to our passengers, to our non-aviation friends, and even to other airline employees who may pose the awkward question concerning surplus pilots. Staying safe The prime argument against single-crew operations is, of course, safety. Research has already shown that the majority of passengers are uneasy about the concept of single-pilot operations. As we know so very well, the first comment made to us in the toilet queue at the front of the aircraft is, so, who is flying the plane then? Underlying that jocular query is a certain nervousness. Understandable. Examples of where two pilots have been needed to overcome an in-flight emergency are legion. The A320 ditching in the Hudson in 2009 is perhaps the best known. Two very experienced pilots had to work quickly and decisively together to pull off a successful ditching without automation. Much more recently, an upgrading captain collapsed at the controls of an Embraer E175LR and subsequently died from a heart attack. This took place immediately after departure from Chicago. A safe return was effected by the acting first officer within 10 minutes of takeoff. This second example begs the question as to how an automated system could instantly identify pilot incapacitation. This is often a subtle event, as we well know from our simulator checks. No rapid-reaction dead mans switch can conceivably be developed for aviation that could immediately take control of the airliner, inform Air Traffic Control, brief the cabin crew, and perform a safely navigated full-flight and auto-land system (always assuming that there was a compatible airfield within range). Making decisions Weather radar is good in many modern aircraft, but route change decision-making with consensus is needed, which takes into account the overall considerations of CBs, turbulence, icing, terrain, and alternative airfields. Automation is nowhere near as reliable as two or three heads (and four or six eyes) when it comes to such complex decisions. And what if the weather radar becomes inoperative? This is not an uncommon event following a bird strike after departure. Ground-weather radar is a rarity outside of North America in civil aviation. Let us not ignore the requirement for visits to the toilet. How would the complete absence of a trained pilot in the cockpit compromise flight safety? In fact, the automation of a large airliner is highly integrated and complex. It needs information from a battery of various sensors to work properly. Sensors themselves are by no means 100% reliable. If some of the data is lost because of sensor failure, the aircraft can no longer be flown automatically. Should a single person then be left to accurately hand-fly a crippled aircraft involving navigation and communication, in addition to monitoring all instrumentation, the pilot will become overwhelmed very quickly. Two-crew training, tough enough in itself, either involves both people combining to manage emergency situations, or one pilot managing the cruise for short periods while the aircraft is operating normally and flight conditions are suitable. Training and experience Lets add a few more simple concepts that overcome the idea of single-pilot airliner operation. First, training. How does a newly trained pilot acquire the necessary experience without much practice, combined with mentoring by a range of seasoned captains? The present system has reduced the number of skilled personnel on a flight deck from five to two over the past 50 years. The two pilots today manage the flying, monitoring, radio communications, navigation plus the duties of a flight engineer. This is a limit that cannot realistically be reduced further. Second, the insurance cost for a single-pilot airliner would probably be double that of the same airliner operated by two trained pilots. The legal world would make sure of this, given the absence of data of single-pilot airliner operations. This, in itself, demolishes the cost-saving arguments being put forward by certain airlines and government regulatory departments. Consider fatigue. A routine four-sector day in European winter conditions can be exhausting for a hard-working crew on the line in a modern automated airliner, such as the A320 Neo. The thought of one person conducting a late-night non-precision approach in challenging weather conditions at the end of such a working day does not bear thinking about. Perish the thought that a go-around followed by a diversion should then be required. The safety margin would be frighteningly low. Apart from removing the undoubted benefit of a short nap in the cruise while the other colleague manages the flight, let us not ignore the normal physiological requirement for visits to the toilet. Thats generally fine with two crew, despite sometimes needing to inconvenience waiting passengers outside the loo. How would the temporary, but complete, absence of a trained pilot in the cockpit compromise flight safety? Heaven forbid that the entrusted single pilot should suffer from vomiting or diarrhoea, requiring frequent and perhaps lengthy absences. A state of 100% health and alertness can never be guaranteed for us fragile humans, no matter how strong we may feel at the start of the day. Finally, let us not overlook the recently updated software of the Boeing 737 MAX airliner, where the presence of two pilots on each flight could not prevent the death of 386 people. The cost of the original error ran into billions of dollars. Obviously, there could be almost no limit to the costs of developing and testing software that would permit greater reliance on automation that would work for just one pilot certainly nothing that todays manufacturers could remotely afford. In conclusion, the arguments being put forward for reduced costs of singlepilot/ground-based pilot airliner operation are both fallacious and inherently risky. All people in government and aircraft manufacture and, indeed, the travelling public need to be continually reminded of this.