INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FOR PILOTS: WILL IT NEVER CHANGE? By Captain Mike Clarke, honorary member Keeping an airline and its staff afloat – and content – can be a tricky business aving served for 20 years on BALPA’s National Executive Committee (NEC), it’s only fair to give a brief background to my interest. I began as a reluctant member; having been in the air force, I was not in favour of joining. Within two years of being employed by British European Airways, the Association declared a strike against the company. It seemed grossly immoral to remain a non-member and then accept whatever uplifts in salary that would, hopefully, follow the proposed action. The strike produced an acceptance of an improved offer and the action was called off. After this, I stood for election and my personal involvement was about to begin. At this stage, senior captains flying the Comet earned £5,000 a year, and the company chairman £10,000. It seemed a reasonable disparity for the airline boss to enjoy his comfort zone in the pay stakes. When I was elected to the chairmanship of the BEA pilots’ committee, it automatically brought me onto the NEC. In that period, the two major parts of the Association were BOAC and BEA, which had a combined membership of around 2,500. The ‘independent’ pilots’ council group added another 1,100-1,200 members. The independent council did, without doubt, have the worst industrial problems. It was the dreaded era of large-scale charter work, troop contracts, and reduced working benefits in comparison with the far more secure work of the two corporations, with their large, unopposed route structures. A major sadness for me throughout the 1960s and up to the 1980s was the regular financial failure, which usually peaked in the winter months. Companies that many readers will have difficulty recalling fell off the financial edge and disappeared forever, including Orion; Pegasus Skyways; Hunting Clan; Derby Airlines; Eagle; Court Line; Go, Laker; British Caledonian; Independent; and Blue Air. Some others – such as Monarch and Dan Air – disappeared later. For many of our colleagues, it often meant career termination. Jobs were very hard to find; in many cases – after serving several years in one company – they jumped into the first available lifeboat, only to suffer yet another collapse. The second problem was, of course, the pilots’ imposed discipline of seniority. This frequently pushed many very experienced pilots to the bottom of the list in their new job. It was also not unknown for pension funds to be underfunded or already used in attempts to sustain the company. Even so, one feature seemed constant: when the company went under, the pilots’ careers were frequently terminated – but one group did retire in luxury. As the various Titanics slipped below the waves, various company chairmen seemed to survive in a safe financial lifeboat. Keeping control The airline business is the most extraordinary animal. The respective boards of many airlines face the same problem: all they can control is staff costs. The aircraft they buy cost the same whatever the paint job; the insurances they have to retain, and the fuel they buy, are much the same; and charges for slots at airports – and the standing charges or landing fees – do not vary, either. The major cost that is in their control is staff. This seems to fall into two categories: what they wish to pay the company staff they employ, and how much they wish to allocate to their own rewards, including lucrative share options and bonuses. The target is simple: control one firmly and expand the other. When disparity between the chairman and his highest-earning captain was 50 per cent, this could be seen as very reasonable. Of course, we know it’s much different for today’s CEOs. Perhaps boards should have to take into account a more reasonable ratio between the benefits available at the top of the business and those of the staff who actually generate the company’s worth. It will never happen, but the scale of decisions these boards take over the purchase of aircraft A or B are far less onerous than the decisions taken every day by the crews and engineers involved in ensuring the highest standard demanded for a safe – a very safe – operation, which the paying public expects. My flying career of 30 years started with Sir Sholto Douglas as chairman and ended with Lord King. The five changes involved between them all was a six-year tenure. The majority of the pilot force usually serves close to 30 years. The results produced by respective boards did little to impress the pilot community. While BEA and BOAC were both nationalised, they suffered from government control and direction that they were obliged to follow; this even affected aircraft procurement policy. Ministers often wanted specific routes kept open for political reasons, and oil prices were frequently volatile and beyond control. In BOAC’s case, it was obliged to order the VC10 rather than its preferred option of the Boeing 707 – both very fine aircraft, but the Boeing was lighter and cheaper to operate. With BEA, the Trident was a great aircraft to fly and was not known as ‘The Gripper’ for nothing. Its field performance was not improved when the board asked De Havilland to reduce the fuselage size and take a de-rated Spey engine. Low morale In the late 70s and 80s, it would be fair to say that pilot morale was fairly low – and many would say this was a serious understatement. The BOAC pilots ran a series of restriction of cooperation (ROC) campaigns, which had a serious effect on schedules. A strict adherence to rest times and non-acceptance of various forms of aircraft deficiencies were applied. The BEA group signed a vote of no confidence in the management of the airline. Severe cutbacks in engineering spares disrupted aircraft serviceability, which was widely reported in the press. One captain’s passenger address after yet another serious delay was reported by a journalist on board: “I am ashamed and disgusted at this appalling delay,” he said. It became headline news. Another serious board mistake occurred when they approved and spent millions on a proposal by the then CEO for an ‘ethnic’ colour scheme. It was shown to the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, at the official launch – conducted at a lunch party – and she showed her feelings by picking up her napkin and covering the ghastly tail- plane colours. It was, perhaps, a little ironic that this particular CEO was colour blind. Eventually, the whole fleet had to be changed to a recognisable colour scheme, and more millions were required to correct this crass mistake. Clinging on The sad demise of Thomas Cook in September 2019 underlines, yet again, the real scale of the problems that still exist in our industry. This collapse had been forecast by many commentators for some years, but the board failed to read the tea leaves or take suitable corrective action. It resulted in the largest repatriation of British citizens since Dunkirk, at a cost of around £100m, and about 9,000 UK employees lost their jobs. While another Titanic slips below the financial waves, we can understand what Thomas Cook’s crews will be going through as they try to re-establish their careers. It will also come as no surprise that yet another comfy lifeboat has been made available to those at the top to row away in. It is not known if it is equipped with an outboard motor this time – that’s the usual formula. Short-term tenure at the top and, for a small number of people, not just taking the icing from the cake, but also a large slice of the cake – while the unemployed staff are left with broken careers. BALPA members know that strikes will not be popular with the public; they will never be led like sheep into one, unless they are really annoyed by what the company is trying to impose on them. They will always ensure that they follow the law. They are also aware that they are among the most examined and professionally tested groups in the UK. The arena in which their skills are used is unforgiving, and gravity is a great leveller. If there is an accident, their every twitch and comment will be recorded. Even now, regular reports of pilot fatigue are still being declared. More care to ensure that rosters incorporate proper controls so daily, weekly and monthly duties are reasonable should be monitored carefully. Today, years after investigations by Ruffell Smith and Bader, many pilots still seem to face unresolved fatigue issues. Why? An obvious answer is that it is still cheaper to squeeze the regulations and roster to maximum use – ask any accountant. BALPA has a well-trained, experienced group of professionals working for them at Head Office but, even so, feedback is still needed. Having been involved in two strikes myself, I hope that the organisation will seldom have to take strike action. The failed companies mentioned earlier, whose pilots were turned out of their companies – with so many careers ruined – can happen again. Nearly everyone who ran those companies left as millionaires. Pilots give so much to their employer and, time and again, we see this going unrewarded through the extraordinary difference in executive wages – especially so when an airline goes under. Pilots expect to see some reward for their tireless commitment, and should not be met with the vitriol from management that we have seen of late. Through action in BA and Ryanair, and the demise of Thomas Cook, we’ve seen these situations come to the fore recently. Perhaps a check on what bosses across the industry are gaining from the cake could be more than illuminating. Over to you, and out. PILOTS STILL FACE FATIGUE ISSUES. WHY? BECAUSE IT IS CHEAPER TO SQUEEZE THE REGULATIONS AND ROSTER TO MAXIMUM USE INDUSTRIAL